Evaluated by Qtonic Quantum Lab — independent post-quantum cryptography registry — and adopted by QGram (Quantum2pi) for end-to-end-encrypted messaging. Both verifiable without going through me.
01 — Problem
Banks face a November 14, 2026 SWIFT structured-address cutover and a longer NIST post-quantum migration window. Existing PQC implementations ship as policy papers, lab code, or proprietary HSM black boxes — none of which a payments architect can read, test, or sign.
02 — What I built
KyberLib turns FIPS 203 ML-KEM (CRYSTALS-Kyber) into inspectable Rust. Hybrid classical-plus-quantum handshakes, no_std compilation for HSM embedding, crypto-agile abstraction boundaries, and the DORA Article 5 governance evidence boards now need to support PQC migration without taking on opaque vendor risk.
By the numbers
- FIPS 203
- NIST publication track aligned
- Top 44 %
- Of ~182 PQC libraries (Qtonic Lab)
- no_std
- Embeds in HSMs + secure enclaves
- 1 adopter
- QGram (Quantum2pi) post-quantum messenger
03 — Engineering rigour
Cryptographic standard
FIPS 203 (ML-KEM, formerly CRYSTALS-Kyber)
Hybrid handshake support
Classical TLS + ML-KEM-768 X25519MLKEM768 mode
Compilation
no_std — embeds in HSMs, secure enclaves, embedded targets
Crypto-agility
Abstraction boundaries enable algorithm swap without API change
License
Apache-2.0 / MIT
04 — Independently verified
- Cited in EPAA Quantum-Safe Payments white paper (September 2025)
- Featured in the 2026-06-12 article: KyberLib and the Post-Quantum Banking Migration
- Aligned to NIST FIPS 203 / 204 / 205 publication track
- Evaluated by Qtonic Quantum Lab — independent post-quantum cryptography evaluation registry, ~182 PQC libraries assessed (top 44%, no vendor pay-for-inclusion)
- Adopted by QGram (Quantum2pi) — a post-quantum end-to-end-encrypted peer-to-peer messenger that uses KyberLib for message encryption (verifiable at f6s.com/software/qgram)