Security review, November 2026¶
| Date | 2026-11-18 |
| Reviewer | Sebastien Rousseau, with AI-assisted analysis (Claude) |
| Baseline | main at aabd6de (release v0.0.40), and the fixes on feat/v0.0.41 |
| Measured against | The assurance case |
Scope¶
Everything the project ships or runs:
- The library:
include/crypto_service/andsrc/(options and request validation, both libcurl transports, TLS and redirect settings, credential handling, retries and the time budget, the response, problem andRetry-Afterparsers, hex and base64, theAsyncClientevent loop). - The build:
CMakeLists.txtand the FetchContent pins in the three CMake files, the installed package. - CI and release: every workflow in
.github/workflows/, their permissions and triggers,scripts/,ci/server.ref, and thev0.0.40release files. - The dependency set: libcurl, nlohmann/json 3.12.0, GoogleTest 1.18.0, Google Benchmark 1.10.0.
Out of scope: crypto-server, libcurl's and the TLS library's own code, and GitHub's platform.
Method¶
- Read every source file in
src/and the public headers in full, following each value fromClientOptionsand each response byte to where it is used, against the claims of the assurance case. - Checked each claim's evidence: that the named test exists and asserts what the case says, and that the CI job runs it.
- Reviewed each workflow for its trigger (
pull_requestversuspull_request_target), token permissions,persist-credentials, action pinning, and every${{ }}expression that reaches arun:script; the release workflow step by step for which checks guard which publishing path. - Rebuilt the
v0.0.40source archive and SBOM in a cleanubuntu:24.04container and compared them with the publishedSHA256SUMS(REPRODUCING.md). - Queried OSV for every pinned dependency tag
(
scripts/osv-check.py); checked the repository's Dependabot, code-scanning and secret-scanning alerts. - Reproduced each suspected defect before calling it a finding, and kept a fix only when a test or a run showed it working.
Severity is the impact on a caller of the SDK, taking into account who can trigger it: High (a remote party can compromise the caller's data or process), Medium (a remote party can degrade it, or a plausible misuse exposes data), Low (needs a trusted party to misbehave, or a narrow condition), Info (hardening or a gap in evidence, no defect).
Findings¶
| Id | Severity | Finding | Disposition |
|---|---|---|---|
| F-01 | Low | Unbounded deadline overflowed the call budget's clock arithmetic |
Fixed |
| F-02 | Low | Release version check accepted shell metacharacters, interpolated into a script | Fixed |
| F-03 | Low | Response bodies have no size limit | Accepted |
| F-04 | Low | http:// is accepted for any host |
Accepted, documentation clarified |
| F-05 | Info | Secrets are not wiped from memory | Accepted |
| F-06 | Info | No test shows an untrusted TLS certificate being rejected | Accepted, follow-up proposed |
| F-07 | Low | A dispatched release could publish without the tag check, from another commit | Fixed |
| F-08 | Info | Extra header names are not checked to be HTTP tokens | Accepted, follow-up proposed |
| F-09 | Info | libcurl removes dot segments, so a raw path can leave the base_url path prefix |
Accepted |
| F-10 | Info | libcurl honours proxy environment variables | Accepted, documented |
| F-11 | Info | The Markdown lint runs npx without a lockfile |
Accepted |
F-01: Unbounded deadline overflowed the call budget (Low, fixed)¶
ClientOptions::deadline was checked only to be positive.
detail::Budget adds it to a steady_clock::time_point, whose
representation is nanoseconds, so a deadline near
milliseconds::max() overflowed a signed 64-bit integer: undefined
behaviour, which UBSan reports as
signed integer overflow: 9223372036854775807 * 1000000. The
per-attempt timeout goes to libcurl as a long, 32 bits on Windows,
so a timeout above about 24.8 days was narrowed. Only the caller sets
these values, hence Low.
Fix: both are rejected above 24 hours with std::invalid_argument,
like the existing one-hour cap on retry delays (check_options in
src/settings.cpp). The test Settings.TimeoutAndDeadlineAreAtMostADay
failed before the change and passes after it.
F-02: Release version check accepted shell metacharacters (Low, fixed)¶
release.yml validated the version with the shell pattern
[0-9]*.[0-9]*.[0-9]*, where each * matches any text, so a tag such
as v0.0.41$(id) (a valid git ref name) passed. The next step expanded
${{ steps.version.outputs.version }} directly into a run: script, so
the text would have run as shell, before the tag signature check, in a
job that holds id-token: write and attestations: write. The API
job interpolated its baseline tag the same way. Pushing a tag or
dispatching the workflow already needs write access, so this is defence
in depth.
Fix: the version must match ^[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+$, and both
values reach their scripts through environment variables. Checked with
the old and new checks side by side: the old one accepts 0.0.41$(id)
and 0.0.41";touch${IFS}x;", the new one rejects both and accepts
0.0.41. actionlint passes on every workflow.
F-03: Response bodies have no size limit (Low, accepted)¶
write_body (src/curl_common.cpp) appends the whole body to a string,
and CURLOPT_ACCEPT_ENCODING "" accepts every compression libcurl
supports, so a hostile or compromised server, or anyone on a plain
http:// path, can make one call allocate as much memory as it sends,
or more through a compression bomb, until the timeout ends it.
Disposition: accepted. The server is the caller's chosen, trusted
endpoint, and over https:// nobody else can inject a body. A limit
needs an option and a default that suits every operation (stream
encryption responses can legitimately be large), which is an API
decision for a future release rather than a fix. Recorded as a residual
risk in the assurance case.
F-04: http:// is accepted for any host (Low, accepted)¶
SECURITY.md said http:// was accepted "for loopback development",
which read as if other hosts were refused; the code accepts http://
for any host, and credentials then travel in clear text.
Disposition: accepted. Plain HTTP to a sidecar or a service on a private network is a legitimate deployment, and refusing it would break callers without a migration path. SECURITY.md now states the behaviour exactly, and the assurance case lists it as a residual risk.
F-05: Secrets are not wiped from memory (Info, accepted)¶
API keys, tokens, request bodies and results live in std::string and
std::vector, which are not zeroed when freed; libcurl keeps its own
copies of the headers and body while a transfer runs.
Disposition: accepted. The standard library offers no reliable way to wipe these buffers (reallocation leaves copies), libcurl's copies are out of reach, and the caller holds the same secrets in its own memory. An attacker who can read the process's memory has already won.
F-06: No test shows an untrusted certificate being rejected (Info, accepted)¶
set_security() sets CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER 1 and
CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYHOST 2 on every transfer, and nothing can unset
them, but the only TLS test (CurlTransport.TlsIsVerifiedAndAPlainServerFails)
points an https:// URL at a plain-HTTP server. It proves there is no
fallback to plain text, not that a self-signed or wrong-host
certificate is refused.
Disposition: accepted as a gap in evidence, not a defect: the code path is short and reviewed. A test against a loopback TLS server with a throwaway self-signed certificate is proposed as follow-up work.
F-07: A dispatched release skipped the tag check (Low, fixed)¶
The publish job runs on a tag push or on a workflow_dispatch with
dry_run off, but the step that checks the tag (annotated, signed by a
key in KEYS.asc, with the release message) ran on tag pushes only. A
non-dry-run dispatch on main would have built the archive from
main's HEAD and attached it, unsigned and unchecked, to the release of
whichever tag the version named. It needs a maintainer and the
release environment, hence Low, but it breaks the guarantee that the
release files come from the signed tag.
Fix: the check moved to scripts/verify-release-tag, runs whenever
the run can publish, and also requires the tag to point at the commit
being built. Tested in a clone: at v0.0.40 it verifies the signature
and exits 0; at v0.0.40~1 it exits 1.
F-08: Extra header names are not checked to be tokens (Info, accepted)¶
append_extra (src/settings.cpp) rejects control characters in a
caller's extra header names and values, which prevents CRLF injection,
but accepts a name containing : or a space, which yields a malformed
header line instead of an error.
Disposition: accepted; only the trusted caller supplies these names, and no request splitting is possible. Validating names as RFC 9110 tokens is proposed as follow-up work.
F-09: Dot segments in a raw path (Info, accepted)¶
build() rejects a path without a leading /, with a query,
fragment, space or control character, but not /../. libcurl removes
dot segments by default (CURLOPT_PATH_AS_IS is off), so
request({"GET", "/../other"}) against https://host/api reaches
https://host/other.
Disposition: accepted. The path prefix of base_url is not a
security boundary: the same caller chooses base_url and can reach any
path on that host anyway, and the host itself cannot change.
F-10: Proxy environment variables (Info, accepted)¶
libcurl honours http_proxy, HTTPS_PROXY, ALL_PROXY and
NO_PROXY. Whoever controls the process environment can route requests
through a proxy; over https:// the proxy sees only a CONNECT tunnel
and the server's certificate is still verified, over http:// it sees
everything.
Disposition: accepted; this is the standard behaviour of libcurl programs and what operators expect, and the environment is the caller's. Documented at the network boundary of the assurance case.
F-11: Markdown lint runs npx without a lockfile (Info, accepted)¶
docs-lint.yml runs npx --yes markdownlint-cli2@0.23.3. The
top-level package is pinned, its dependencies are resolved at run time.
Disposition: accepted. The job has a read-only token, no secrets, and its output does not feed a release.
Reviewed with no finding¶
- Header injection. Credentials, traceparent, extra headers, base URL, method and path are all checked for control characters before use, and the tests cover each.
- Redirects and protocols. Both transports set
CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION 0andCURLOPT_PROTOCOLS_STR "http,https"; both clients turn a final 3xx intoTransportError; tested on a real socket. - Error messages. No message carries a body, credential or value; the problem type is sanitised; the response fuzzer aborts on a leak.
- Parsers.
Retry-Aftersaturates long delta-seconds and accepts only IMF-fixdate; JSON is parsed with exceptions off and mapped onto fixed structs; hex and base64 reject bad alphabets and non-canonical padding. Both parsers are fuzzed under ASan and UBSan. - Concurrency.
AsyncClient's shared state is guarded by one mutex and the rest belongs to the loop thread; destruction with calls in flight is tested under TSan. - Stateful-route retries. Matched by substring, so new keygen paths are refused risky retries; tested on both clients.
- CI. Every workflow triggers on
pull_request, neverpull_request_target; the default token is read-only and write scopes are granted per job; checkouts setpersist-credentials: false; every action is pinned by commit SHA;ci/server.refis validated as a full SHA before use. - Dependencies. OSV lists no vulnerability for nlohmann/json v3.12.0, GoogleTest v1.18.0 or Google Benchmark v1.10.0 (queried 2026-11-18); the repository had no open Dependabot, secret-scanning or code-scanning alert other than Scorecard's best-practices badge check.
- Release reproducibility. The
v0.0.40archive rebuilds bit for bit; its SBOM differed only in the random serial number, which is now derived from the content.
Changes made with this review¶
src/settings.cpp: timeout and deadline capped at 24 hours (F-01)..github/workflows/release.yml,.github/workflows/ci.yml: version regex and environment variables instead of interpolation (F-02); tag check on every publishing run (F-07,scripts/verify-release-tag); a second build compared withSHA256SUMS.scripts/sbom.py: content-derived serial number.scripts/osv-check.pyand.github/workflows/osv.yml: automated advisory checks for the pinned archives.ci.yml: builds with the recommended hardening flags on GCC and Clang.SECURITY.md, ASSURANCE.md, REPRODUCING.md: documentation of the above.
Next review¶
At the latest in November 2027, or earlier when a trust boundary in the assurance case changes (a new transport, an option touching TLS or redirects, a new dependency, or a change to the release pipeline).